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CHILD CUSTODY: THE JUDICIAL INTERVIEW OF THE CHILD*
INTRODUCTION
In a contested child custody case, the Louisiana Civil Code requires
that the trial judge determine how to award custody in the best interest
of the child) Although the Code establishes a presumption that joint
custody is in the child's best interest,2 it permits that presumption to
be rebutted. One of the factors which the Code directs the judge to
consider in determining whether there has been such a rebuttal is "[t]he
reasonable preference of the child, if the court deems the child of
sufficient age to express a preference." 3 In order to determine the child's
preference, and also to question him about other relevant factors, the
judge will normally find it necessary either to put the child on the
witness stand, have him evaluated by a mental health professional, or
interview him in chambers.
It seems clear that putting a child on the witness stand in a custody
case, and expecting him to express a preference or reveal damaging facts
about one or both of his parents, is almost certain to make a bad
situation worse. As observed by the New York Court of Appeal in
Lincoln v. Lincoln:4
It requires no great knowledge of child psychology to recognize
that a child, already suffering from the trauma of a broken
home, should not be placed in the position of having its rela-
tionship with either parent further jeopardized by having to
publicly relate its difficulties with them or be required to openly
choose between them.'
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* The author wishes to thank Judges Joseph E. Bleich, E. Donald Moseley, Anthony
J. Graphia, and Jennifer Luse.
1. La. Civ. Code art. 146 provides, in part, that custody of minor children, when
claimed by both parents, shall be awarded in the following order of preference, according
to the best interest of the child: (1) to both parents jointly; (2) to either parent; (3) to
a person in whose home the child has been residing, if it was a stable and wholesome
environment; or (4) to any other qualified person.
2. La. Civ. Code art. 146(C).
3. La. Civ. Code art. 146(C)(2)(i).
4. 24 N.Y.2d 270, 247 N.E.2d 659, 299 N.Y.S.2d 842 (1969).
5. Lincoln, 24 N.Y.2d at 272; 247 N.E.2d at 660; 299 N.Y.S.2d at 843 (1969). See
also Jones, Judicial Questioning of Children in Custody and Visitation Proceedings, 18
Fain. L.Q. 43, 74 (1984) [hereinafter Jones] ("Under no circumstances should a child in
a custody or visitation proceeding be questioned in open court.").
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Accordingly, a child should not be questioned in open court.
Each of the two remaining options-a judicial interview of the child
in chambers or an evaluation by a mental health professional-have
advantages. Both are authorized by Civil Code article 146,6 and both
are often used by Louisiana judges. 7 They will be the subject of this
comment.
Initially, this comment will explore the issue of whether to involve
the child at all. Next, the judicial interview will be analyzed, and
particular attention will be given to the issues of competency and pro-
cedural due process. Suggestions by various authors for eliciting accurate
information from the child in such an interview will be included in the
discussion as well. The use of an evaluation by a mental health profes-
sional as an alternative to the judicial interview will also be examined.
Lastly, a model procedure for the judicial interview will be proposed.
DECIDING TO INVOLVE THE CHILD
In a custody case, the trial judge must decide at the outset whether
to interview the child at all. Some experts prefer not to involve the
child in the proceedings if possible, and will interview the child only
upon the request of one of the parents.' One psychologist who specializes
in mediation, David Saposnek, will only interview the child if he is an
adolescent, or if he has asked to speak to the mediator, or if one parent
claims the child has a preference. Otherwise he prefers not to involve
the child, believing that "when children are involved in the process,
they become repeat victims." 9
6. La. Civ. Code art. 146(H):
In a custody or visitation proceeding, an evaluation may be ordered on the
motion of either party. The evaluation shall be made by a mental health
professional agreed upon by the parties or selected by the court. The court may
apportion the costs of the investigation between the parties and shall order both
parties and the children to submit to and cooperate in the evaluation, testing,
or interview by the mental health professional. The mental health professional
shall provide the court and both parties with a written report. The mental health
professional shall serve as the witness of the court subject to cross-examination
by either party. For the purposes of this Article, "mental health professional"
means a psychiatrist or a person who possesses a Master's degree in counseling,
social work, psychology, or marriage and family counseling.
See also La. Civ. Code art. 146(C)(3): "For the purpose of assisting the court in making
a determination whether an award of joint custody is appropriate, the court may direct
that an investigation be conducted." See also La. Civ. Code art. 146(G): "A custody
hearing may be held in the private chambers of the judge."
7. This conclusion is based on informal interviews with judges. (The lack of cases
describing the procedures used by Louisiana trial courts makes this method of gathering
information necessary.)
8. Interviews with Louisiana judges.
9. D. Saposnek, Mediating Child Custody Disputes 13 (1983) [hereinafter Saposnek].
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Other experts recognize that because the child's future will be pro-
foundly affected by the outcome of a custody case,"0 the child will often
have definite ideas about where he wants to live." Sensitivity and fairness
to the child warrant that he be consulted as to whether he would like
to participate in the proceedings.' 2 Nevertheless, it should be explained
to the child that he need not express a preference, so as to avoid
pressuring him into offering one.
THE JUDICIAL INTERVIEW
In order to question the child about his preference and related
factors, the judge must interview the child himself and/or order an
evaluation of the child and his parents by a mental health professional.
In the event the judge chooses to interview the child, he must first
ascertain that the child is competent to testify. The procedure he uses
must also satisfy the requirements of due process. The Louisiana Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeal's decision in Watermeier v. Watermeier3 was
the first attempt by a Louisiana court to develop guidelines for the
judicial interview of a child in a custody case.
I. WATERMEIER V. WATERMEIER
In Watermeier, the trial judge intended to interview a five year old
who had been in the custody of his mother. The interview was to be
conducted in the judge's chambers, without the presence of the parents
or their attorneys, and no record was to be made. The father objected
to this procedure, and the appellate court upheld his objections.
The court of appeal held that the trial judge did not have the right
or discretion to interview the child in the proposed manner, because it
was contrary to the concept of the adversary system.14 The court then
established the following procedure for the interview of a child:
[T]he interview must be conducted in chambers outside of the
presence of the parties, but in the presence of their attorneys,
with a record being made by the court reporter. The judge shall
first determine his competency as "a person of proper under-
standing" by interrogating the child with appropriate questions.
The attorneys shall be allowed to participate in the competency
10. Lombard, Judicial Interviewing of Children in Custody Cases: An Empirical and
Analytical Study, 17 U.C.D.L. Rev. 807, 812 (1984) [hereinafter Lombard].
11. Newman and Collester, Children Should Be Seen and Heard, 2:4 Fam. Advoc.
8 (1980) [hereinafter Newman and Collester].
12. Note, Lawyering for the Child: Principles of Representation in Custody and
Visitation Disputes Arising from Divorce, 87 Yale L.J. 1126, 1165-66 (1978).
13. 462 So. 2d 1272 (La. App. 5th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 So. 2d 301 (La. 1985).
14. 462 So. 2d at 1275.
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examination by asking questions and registering appropriate but
only necessary objections. If the judge determines that the child
is not a competent witness as outlined above, he shall imme-
diately terminate the interview.
However, if the judge determines that the child is competent,
he may continue the interview in the presence of the attorneys
as observers only. They shall not participate by asking questions,
or cross-examining or registering objections .... 1
The court recognized that this procedure is "admittedly a compromise,"
but deemed it necessary to protect both the child's welfare and the
foundations of the adversary system. 16
The court also noted that this procedure is not mandatory when
neither party objects to an examination of a child by the judge in
another manner. The judge can, in such a case, examine the child "in
chambers, on or off the record, and with or without parents and/or
counsel being present-provided all agree on the procedure."' 7
The Louisiana Supreme Court denied writs with a brief mention by
Justice Calogero that the court of appeal "struck a good compromise
in a difficult situation."' 8 He recognized that a judge seeking to interview
a child must strike a balance between two potentially inconsistent ob-
jectives. The judge must create an atmosphere where the child is not
afraid to speak freely, and yet preserve the rights of the parties to
appellate review, an opportunity that would be sacrificed if the interview
were completely confidential.19 Any improvements on the Watermeier
approach must likewise seek to balance these objectives.
II. COMPETENCY TO TESTIFY
A. Louisiana Statutes and Jurisprudence
Arguably, Civil Code article 146(C)(2)(i) establishes its own standard
of competency for the child to be interviewed. By its terms, if the child
is "of sufficient age to express a preference," he may be interviewed
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Watermeier, 464 So. 2d at 301.
19. Id. But cf. Osborne v. McCoy, 485 So. 2d 150 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1986), in
which the court found that, where a child interviewed by a judge in chambers without
a record being made expressed a strong preference for living with her mother, Watermeier
did not support the mother's request for a remand to get the child's testimony before
the appellate court, because the lower court's finding regarding the child's preference was
in the appellant-mother's favor.
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by the judge. 20 Although this language might be liberally construed to
include almost any child old enough to talk, most judges have not taken
such a simplistic approach to child competency. Rather, they interpret
the article as requiring that the child be competent to testify in the
traditional sense of witness competency. 2' Since it is unlikely that the
child's testimony will be limited to his expressing a preference, and will
probably require in addition his giving the reasons for his preference, 22
the child performs no more limited a function than any other witness.
Arguably, therefore, traditional competency standards are more appro-
priately suited to the determination than the "sufficient age" criterion
of article 146.
To be competent to testify in a civil proceeding, a witness must
have "proper understanding. ' ' 23 In addition, the Louisiana Revised Stat-
utes which concern criminal procedure provide specifically that under-
standing, and not age, must determine whether a person can be a witness
in a criminal proceeding. Moreover, no child less than twelve years old
may be sworn as a witness in a criminal proceeding over the objection
of the district attorney or the defendant "until the court is satisfied,
after examination, that such child has sufficient understanding to be a
witness. "24
In the absence of a corresponding civil provision, the criminal statute
requiring a competency examination of children under age twelve may
logically be extended to apply in civil cases also, since the basic standard
of competency (proper understanding) is the same in either context.
Indeed, the court in Watermeier approved the synthesis of these pro-
visions by citing both the civil and criminal rules and by mandating
that the judge determine the competency of a five year old boy before
interviewing him. 25
The synthesis of these provisions results in the following rule: the
test of competency in a civil proceeding is whether the person has "proper
understanding." Age alone is not determinative of competency, but if
the witness is under twelve years old, the court must examine him to
20. La. Civ. Code art. 146(C)(2)(i) provides that the court may consider "[t]he
reasonable preference of the child, if the court deems the child to be of sufficient age
to express a preference." (emphasis added).
21. Interviews with Louisiana judges.
22. Eliciting only a preference from the child is likely to lead to poor results. The
judge should be able to ask the child the reasons for his preference, which would often
result in the child testifying as to facts and occurrences. La. Civ. Code art. 146(C)(2)(1)
allows the judge to consider any factor relevant to the custody dispute.
23. La. R.S. 13:3665 (1968): "The competent witness in any civil proceeding in court
or before a person having authority to receive evidence shall be a person of proper
understanding."
24. La. R.S. 15:469 (1981) (emphasis added).
25. Watermeier, 462 So. 2d at 1274.
19871
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
determine if he has proper understanding. This determination is left to
the discretion of the judge.
Other Louisiana decisions support this approach. As early as 1910,
the Louisiana Supreme Court recognized that a young child should be
allowed to testify in a custody proceeding if he is a competent witness,
but that his testimony could be excluded "because of incompetency
resulting from his tender years. "26 In another case, the supreme court
refused to allow a six year old girl to testify in her mother's separation
suit because she was not deemed to be a person of proper under-
standing. 27 There are many cases where, after examination, children well
under twelve years of age have been found competent to testify. 28 The
youngest child ever allowed to testify in Louisiana, that has been re-
ported, was four years old.2
9
B. Suggested Topics and Questions to Use in the Competency
Examination
Generally, when examining the child for proper understanding, a
judge looks at several factors. These have been summarized as follows:
1) present intelligence to understand, after instruction, the duty
to tell the truth;
2) mental capacity at the time of the occurrence (if the child
is to testify to a specific fact) sufficient to observe and register
it;
3) memory adequate to recollect independently the occurrence
or fact;
4) capacity to express his recollection or impression in words;
5) capacity to understand simple questions about the occurrence
or impression.30
26. Chavigny v. Hava, 125 La. 710, 711, 51 So. 696, 696 (1910) (syllabus by the
court).
27. Wilson v. Moser, 210 La. 1021, 29 So. 2d 49 (1946).
28. State v. Edwards, 419 So. 2d 881 (La. 1982) (child five years old at crime, six
at trial); State v. Arnaud, 412 So. 2d 1013 (La. 1982) (four years old); State v. Humphrey,
412 So. 2d 507 (La. 1981), (seven at crime, nine at trial); State v. Sharp, 338 So. 2d
654 (La. 1976) (eight years old); State v. Glover, 262 La. 495, 263 So. 2d 866 (1972)
(twelve years old); State v. Parker, 181 La. 635, 160 So. 123 (1935) (ten years old).
29. That the author could discover. See Arnaud, 412 So. 2d 1013.
30. See Stafford, The Child as a Witness, 37 Wash. L. Rev. 303, 313 (1962) [here-
inafter Stafford]; Siegel and Hurley, The Role of the Child's Preference in Custody
Proceedings, 11 Fam. L.Q. 1, 35 (1977) [hereinafter Siegel and Hurley]; Newman and
Collester, supra note 11; J. McCahey, M. Kaufman, C. Kraut, and J. Zett, Child Custody
and Visitation Law and Practice, Vol. 2, § 12.04(2), at 12.19 & n.12 (1986) [hereinafter
McCahey]; and Melton, Children's Competency to Testify, 5 Law and Human Behavior
73, 74-75 (1981) [hereinafter Melton].
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Judges generally evaluate these factors by asking the child simple
questions aimed at accomplishing a dual purpose. They help the judge
determine the child's intelligence, memory, verbal capacity, and under-
standing of the difference between truth and falsehood; they also help
to put the child at ease." For instance, questions frequently asked by
Louisiana judges are the following:
1) What's your name?
2) Where do you go to school?
3) Do you know the difference between the truth and a lie?
4) Do you know that you're supposed to tell the truth?
5) Do you know what will happen if you lie?
6) Do you go to church?3 2
Some hesitancy in answering questions should be expected at first,
and does not of itself indicate incompetency. 3 The child need not
understand the meaning of the oath in its technical legal sense, as long
as he understands his obligation to tell the truth.3 4 Also, it is not
necessary that the child be able to explain exactly what will happen if
he lies, as long as he knows lying is a crime or is wrong, and fears
some form of punishment.3 Nor is it necessary that the child attend
church or have any particular religious background. Questions regarding
a child's church attendance or belief in God are used as a short cut,
since it is likely that a child who goes to church will have been taught
that it is wrong to lie. 36
Most importantly, the questions must be kept simple and easy to
understand, although this may be difficult for judges and lawyers ac-
customed to communicating with other professionals in a highly abstract
manner.3 7 In preparing the questions to be used to determine competency,
the judge should try to cover certain areas:
31. Interviews with Louisiana judges. See also Stafford, supra note 30, at 17; and
Siegel and Hurley, supra note 30, at 38-39.
32. Interviews with Louisiana judges.
33. Humphrey, 412 So. 2d at 516; State v. Armstrong, 453 So. 2d 1256, 1259 (La.
App. 2d Cir.), cert. denied, 457 So. 2d 16 (La. 1984). See also Sharp, 338 So. 2d at
661.
34. Siegel and Hurley, supra note 30, at 36-37; Melton, supra note 30, at 74; and
Stafford, supra note 30, at 318.
35. Sharp, 338 So. 2d at 661; Glover, 262 La. 495, 263 So. 2d 866 (1972); Parker,
181 La. 635, 160 So. 123 (1935). See also Siegel and Hurley, supra note 30, at 36;
Stafford, supra note 30, at 318.
36. Siegel and Hurley, supra note 30, at 36-37; Melton, supra note 30, at 74; Stafford,
supra note 30, at 318.
37. Lombard, supra note 10, at 827. Purposefully regressing to simpler language
might prove difficult. See Stafford, supra note 30, at 314: "[Q]uestions which appear
simple and direct [to the interrogators] may be confusing or absolutely meaningless to a
child. A six-year-old child might give an unsatisfactory answer if asked 'with whom do
you reside?' However, he could readily answer 'with whom do you live?'
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1) questions about home and family members;
2) questions about school, including grade, teachers, subjects,
attendance record, favorite activities, and academic performance;
3) questions to ascertain the child's knowledge of the difference
between truth and falsehood, and his duty to tell the truth.3
8
Finally, the determination of competency should be based not only
on the child's answers, but on his overall demeanor during the dialogue. 9
Even if the child appears to have been "coached," such an appearance
does not justify exclusion of his testimony. Coaching is a matter of
credibility, not competency, and goes to the weight to be given the
evidence, not to its admission.
40
C. Approaches Used in Other States
As early as 1895, the United States Supreme Court identified the
factors necessary to make a determination of child competency in Wheeler
v. United States.4 l The Court held that no precise age is indicative of
competency; rather, the determination depends on the child's capacity
and intelligence, and his appreciation of the difference between truth
and falsehood, as well as of his duty to tell the truth. 42
Appellate courts of most states have followed the Wheeler approach,
and have generally considered four years of age to be the minimum at
which a child may be found competent. 43 Most state courts have also
required that the child be found competent not only at the time of the
trial, but also at the time of the occurrence about which he is to testify."
Thus, the procedures described for use in Louisiana are consistent with
those applied in most American jurisdictions.
D. A Behavioral Science Approach to Competency
Recent research supports allowing young children to testify in legal
proceedings. 4 A study done in 1979 by members of the Department of
38. Stafford, supra note 30, at 316-17.
39. Humphrey, 412 So. 2d at 516; Armstrong, 453 So. 2d at 1259.
40. State v. Edwards, 420 So. 2d 663, 677 (La. 1982); see also Siegal and Hurley,
supra note 30, at 40; Stafford, supra note 30, at 309.
41. 159 U.S. 523, 16 S. Ct. 93 (1895).
42. Wheeler, 159 U.S. at 526, 16 S. Ct. at 93.
43. Stafford, supra note 30, at 305. In Wheeler, the Court upheld the competency
of a five year old to testify.
44. Id. at 306; Siegel and Hurley, supra note 30, at 19.
45. One particularly helpful summary of the current state of social science research
is found in.40 J. of Social Issues 1-175 (1984), which is entirely devoted to the topic of
"The Child Witness."
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Psychology, Loyola University of Chicago (the Loyola study),46 indicates
that the only area in which children were inferior to adult witnesses
was that of free recall. In other words, after witnessing a staged event,
the subjects were asked an open-ended question, such as "What can
you remember about the event?" Performance by all ages was poor,
but the number of items remembered increased linearly with age. It is
noteworthy, however, that younger children, although able to remember
fewer items, were less likely to "remember" incorrect items.
When objective "yes or no" questions were asked, there was no
significant difference in performance among age groups. 47 Nor was there
a significant difference among age groups when asked to identify a
participant from an array of photographs; data suggested, however, that
adolescents might perform this task somewhat better than younger
groups.41
One area of long-standing concern to members of the legal profession
has been whether child witnesses tend to be more open to suggestion
than adult witnesses. The Loyola study concluded that there is no
difference among age groups in susceptibility to leading questions. 49
However, the study used only one leading question, and subsequently
has been criticized for that reason.- Gary Melton, of the University of
Virginia, points out in his discussion of the Loyola study that suggest-
ibility is a real problem, even for the average adult witness. In his view,
it is to be expected on the basis of simple learning theory that children
would be more susceptible to suggestion, if only because they would
want to give the adult questioner the answer he seemed to want.5 Also,
since children have more trouble with free recall than adults, they must
be asked more questions and given more prompts, which would further
tend to expose them to suggestion.5 2 Melton does not suggest, however,
that the study results are clearly wrong; rather, he suggests a need for
further research.
Melton also raises another consideration: that of young children's
different conceptions of events.5 3 Classical theory, pioneered by Jean
46. Matin, Holmes, Guth and Kovac, 3 Law and Human Behavior 295 (1978) [here-
inafter Marin].
47. But females were significantly more accurate on this test than males. Id. at 301.
48. Id. at 302.
49. Id. at 297, 303.
50. Melton, supra note 30, at 80. Cf. Cohen & Harnick, "The Susceptibility of Child
Witnesses to Suggestion," 4 Law & Human Behavior 201 (1980); and Johnson & Foley,
"Differentiating Fact from Fantasy: The Reliability of Children's Memory," 40 J. of
Social Issues 33 (1984).
51. Id. Melton is Professor of Psychology and Law, and Director of the Law/
Psychology Program, University of Nebraska-Lincoln.
52. Id. at 81.
53. Id. at 77-79, 82.
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Piaget, the renowned expert on child development, suggests that children
up to about age seven have trouble perceiving all of the relevant in-
formation in a stimulus. They tend to be "egocentric," or centered in
their own personal perspective, and have trouble grasping certain con-
cepts. Such a problem with reality would affect the child's ability to
perceive facts accurately; thus he could not recite them accurately in
his testimony. 4
However, recent critics have argued that the problem is not that
the child does not perceive accurately; rather, the child has trouble
finding words to express what he saw. Melton suggests that if this is
indeed the case, even very young children can be good witnesses if the
interrogator is able to use simple words the child understands.55 Also,
if a judge is able to "read between the lines" of the child's testimony
and understand what he is really trying to say, then the child's cognitive
immaturity will be of little significance.16
For now, both the Loyola study and Melton's analysis of it agree
that the "liberal use of children's testimony is well founded." 5 7 Even
very young children can be good witnesses, considering that they are
as capable as adults of answering direct objective questions and are no
more prone to lying. Although they may be more susceptible to sug-
gestion, there is probably not a significant difference.5"
E. Proposal to Use the Federal Rules of Evidence
As the behavioral science approach indicates, children are not nec-
essarily less competent to testify than adults. Accordingly, some experts
have suggested that children need not be examined for competency at
all, but that children should be put on the stand and allowed to testify
just as any other witness. The credibility and weight to be given their
testimony would be left to the jury, or in a custody case, to the judge. 9
This approach is evident in Rule 601 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. 60
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 81.
58. Id. at 81-82; Marin, supra note 46, at 304.
59. Melton, supra note 30, at 74-76: "Wigmore (1940, § 509) has recommended
abolition of the requirement that a child's competency be established before he or she
can testify. He would have the trier of fact simply evaluate a child's testimony in context,
just as any other witness's testimony must be examined for its credibility."
60. Fed. R. Evid. 601:
Every person is competent to be a witness except as otherwise provided by these
Rules. However, in civil actions and proceedings, with respect to an element of
a claim or defense as to which State law supplies the rule of decision, the
[Vol. 47
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Such an approach would simplify matters procedurally, as judges
could dispense with the child competency determination. In the long
run, however, the time actually saved would be minimal, considering
that the same questions used to determine competency are frequently
the "easy" questions used to relax the child. Thus, a certain amount
of time would still have to be spent in allowing the child to become
familiar and comfortable with the proceedings.
Louisiana is currently contemplating adopting an evidence code, but
there have been no proposals to modify the standard of competency
now in effect, that is, that a competent witness must be a person of
proper understanding. 6' Likewise, there is no proposal addressing the
examination of children. In the absence of any foreseeable changes in
the evidence statutes, the solution proposed herein will be compatible
with current Louisiana evidence law.
F. Recommendation
. The procedure proposed in the Watermeier case regarding child
competency should be followed. The judge will determine the competency
of a child under twelve years old by asking him appropriate questions,
such as the ones listed in part B of this section. The parents may not
be present, but their attorneys may participate by asking questions and
registering necessary objections. The objections should be kept to a
minimum to avoid distracting or harassing the child. A record of the
examination shall be made by the court reporter, and the examination
should be held in the judge's chambers. If the court finds that the child
is not competent, the interview will not take place. Otherwise, the judge
may proceed with the interview.
III. PROCEDURE FOR THE JUDICIAL INTERVIEW
The only statutory guidance for the judge seeking a procedure by
which to conduct the interview is found in Civil Code article 146, which
competency of a witness shall be determined in accordance with State law.
See also 3 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Weinstein's Evidence 601101], at 601-9: "(A)ny
person will be competent to testify as an ordinary witness" unless he refuses the oath,
is the judge, or is a juror. See also id. 6011041, at 601-32: "It had been the practice
... to have the court determine whether the child is competent .... In view of the
approach of Rule 601 it is unlikely that such a voir dire . . . will be conducted."
61. Proposed La. Code of Evidence, House Bill Holding. The examination in the
judge's chambers is the only variation on traditional courtroom procedure, and it is
specifically authorized by La. Civ. Code art. 146(G); see supra note 5 and accompanying
text.
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provides that a custody hearing may be held in the judge's chambers.62
The jurisprudence is scarce, Watermeier being the first attempt by an
appellate court to instruct trial courts on a procedure to follow. 63
As noted, Watermeier requires the interview to take place in cham-
bers, and that a record be made. Only the attorneys may attend, but
they may not participate. The parties may not be present. This procedure
is designed as a compromise between the child's need to speak freely
to the judge and the parents' rights to due process of law. The Wa-
termeier approach recognizes the hazards which accompany putting a
child on the witness stand in open court; 64 in recommending that the
interview take place in chambers, the court was certainly responsive to
the argument that a child may be more inclined to speak freely and
truthfully if his parents are absent. 65
However, there are difficulties with the Watermeier procedure. Even
though the parents are absent, their attorneys are present, and the child
is likely to harbor the reasonable suspicion that they will repeat anything
he says to his parents.66 Furthermore, his statements will be recorded
exactly as he makes them, and thus may be accessible to his parents
as part of the record. Obviously, the child will still worry about his
parents' reactions under the Watermeier procedure.
The court recognized this dilemma, but refused to allow a completely
confidential judicial interview, as had been intended by the trial judge.
The court reasoned that to do so would "do violence to the basic
62. See La. Civ. Code art. 146(G), supra note 5. Currently, Louisiana judges ap-
parently use a variety of different procedures. One, for instance, conducts the interview
in the courtroom, but empties it of everyone except the parties' attorneys and the court
staff; others prefer to conduct it in chambers; and some will use either method, depending
on the circumstances. See also Lombard, supra note 10. The author discusses a study
done in Michigan, where the custody statute is almost identical to Louisiana Civil Code
article 146. The twenty-six judges interviewed used various approaches, but eighty percent
ot them opposed any attempt to establish a standard procedure by rule or statute. This
study indicates that a standard solution for Louisiana, like the one to be proposed by
this comment, should not be mandatory if the judge and parties can agree on another.
63. For a previous case in which the Louisiana fifth circuit approved a custody award
based on a private judicial interview, see LeGrand v. LeGrand, 455 So. 2d 705 (La. App.
5th Cir. 1984). The court said that although it could not review the private interview,
the trial court's decision was entitled to great weight, and other evidence supported the
award. See also Vidrine v. Demourelle, 363 So. 2d 943 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1978), in which
the third circuit tacitly approved a private judicial interview on which the custody award
was partly based.
64. See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text.
65. Watermeier, 462 So. 2d at 1274.
66. Lombard, supra note 10, at 813. Indeed, the attorneys may have an ethical
obligation to inform the parents of exactly what took place in the interview. See Model
Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.4: "A lawyer shall keep a client reasonably informed
about the status of a matter and promptly comply with reasonable requests for infor-
mation."
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concepts of our adversary system ' 67 and would obstruct appellate review
of the decision, since there would be no way to contest or disprove any
statement the child had made, nor to prove that the judge erred or
abused his discretion in the interview. 61 In so doing, the court indicated
that procedural due process requires that if the parties are excluded,
their attorneys must be present as observers, and a record must be
made.
A. Requirements of Due Process
The fourteenth amendment guarantees that no state shall deprive a
person of life, liberty or property without due process of law. 69 Custody
cases involve the state depriving one or both of the parents of the right
to live with and rear their child. As the second circuit declared in In
re Howard,70 the "integrity of the family and the right of a parent to
raise his child has been recognized as a fundamental right or liberty
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. ' 7 Thus, the requirements of
procedural due process must be followed in the custody proceedings.
The essence of procedural due process is the use of a procedure
that reasonably guarantees a fair and accurate result. 72 The test for
compliance takes into account not only the liberty interest of the in-
dividual involved, but any governmental interest that may exist in re-
stricting the enjoyment of that liberty interest. The necessary balancing
in this context of the parents' rights against the state's interest in the
child's welfare must take place within the three-part inquiry set forth
by the United States Supreme Court in Mathews v. Eldridge.73 Noting
that "due process is flexible and calls for such procedural protection
as the particular situation demands, ' 74 the Court identified the following
three factors as necessary for consideration:
67. Watermeier, 462 So. 2d at 1274.
68. Id. at 1274-75. But see Osborne v. McCoy, 485 So. 2d 150 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1986), discussed supra note 19.
69. U. S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1: "(N)or shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . ... " See also La. Const. art. 1,
§ 2: "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property except by due process of
law."
70. 382 So. 2d 194 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1980).
71. Howard, 382 So. 2d at 198. See also Smith v. Organization of Foster Families,
431 U.S. 816, 97 S. Ct. 2094 (1977); Lombard, supra note 10, at 811.
72. 16A Am. Jur. 2d Constitutional Law § 809 (1979): "The due process clause has
as its purpose the insuring of the fair and orderly administration of the laws .... .
(footnotes omitted).
73. 424 U.S. 319, 96 S. Ct. 893 (1976). Although this case involved an administrative
proceeding to terminate government benefits, the test has been applied in civil proceedings,
including a paternity action. Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1, 101 S. Ct. 2202 (1981). Thus,
the Mathews test should apply to a civil custody suit. Lombard, supra note 10, at 820.
74. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334, 96 S. Ct. at 902.
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1. the private interest that will be affected by the action;
2. the risk of an erroneous deprivation of that interest through
the current procedure, and the probable value of any additional
or substitute procedural safeguards;
3. the government interest, including:
(a) the fiscal and administrative burdens the proposed safe-
guards would entail, 75 and
(b) the function involved.
The following analysis attempts to place the judicial interview of
the child within this framework.
1. The Private Interest Affected
The interest of the parents in the outcome of a custody suit is, of
course, great: they face the possibility of losing physical custody of the
child. Although a custody award to one parent with a denial of visitation
rights to the other parent is rare, such a decree is possible. Even if the
noncustodial parent is awarded liberal visitation rights, he may well lose
the right to make decisions affecting the rearing of his child, such as
where the child will attend school, if and what kind of religious training
the child will receive, and how the child's social life will be structured. 76
Consequently, the noncustodial parent will lose that day to day contact
with the child that is essential to the development of a close parent-
child relationship. 77
Undeniably, the nature of the private interest affected by an ad-
judication of custody is very important. Indeed, a parent's right to raise
his children is at the very heart of American values, and has been
recognized as a 'fundamental right. 7s The need for a procedure that
75. Using the presence of the attorneys as a safeguard would impose no additional
burden on the government, and the cost of recording the interview is insubstantial. Most
such proceedings are already recorded using court staff, and the parties pay the cost, not
the government. Any such minimal increase in cost to the parties would be outweighed
by the increased protection against error or abuse of discretion, and the benefit of having
a record available to the appellate court.
76. Lombard, supra note 10, at 820-23.
77. Id.
78. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152, 93 S. Ct. 705, 726 (1973) for a summary
of the Court's position and citations to major cases:
[Tihe court has recognized that a right of personal privacy does exist under the
Constitution. These decisions make it clear that only personal rights that can
be deemed "fundamental" or "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" are
included in this guarantee of personal privacy. They also make it clear that the
right has some extension to activities relating to marriage, contraception, family
relationships, and child rearing and education. (citations omitted). See also Moore
v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503, 97 S. Ct. 1932, 1938 (1977) ("Our
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minimizes the risk of error therefore becomes critical in the due process
analysis .71
2. The Risk of Error
When a judge interviews a child, the chance of his receiving in-
accurate impressions and information is very real. For instance, the
judge has no way to verify the accuracy of the child's statements without
asking the parents. Understandably reluctant to reveal the child's state-
ments to the parents, the judge might accept an inaccurate statement
at face value 80 or might disregard an accurate statement rather than try
to verify it.
In addition, the judge usually is not trained to communicate effec-
tively with young children.8 Children involved in divorces often use
identifiable strategies to cope with the stress.12 Unless the judge can
recognize the strategy for what it is, he may reach inaccurate conclusions
about the child's feelings.8 3
Finally, as noted earlier in the discussion of competency, a child
may still be developing language skills and cognitive abilities. The lack
of training of most judges in this crucial area of child development8 4
adds to the risk of error. All of these factors which contribute to the
risk of error increase the need for procedural safeguards when ascer-
taining the child's preference. 5
decisions establish that the Constitution protects the sanctity of the family
precisely because the institution of the family is deeply rooted in this Nation's
history and tradition."); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651, 92 S. Ct. 1208,
1213 (1972) ("The integrity of the family unit has found protection in the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment .. .
79. Lombard, supra note 10, at 820-23.
80. Id. at 824.
81. Goldzband, Consulting in Child Custody Cases 33-34 [hereinafter Goldzband].
For a thorough discussion of suggested approaches for effective communication by the
judge during a judicial interview, see infra notes 102-120 and accompanying text.
82. Saposnek, supra note 9, at 119-33. For a list of common coping strategies see
text infra at notes 110-112.
83. See text at infra notes 110-112.
84. Goldzband, supra note 81, at 33-34; R. Gardner, Family Evaluation in Child
Custody Litigation 156 (1982) [hereinafter Gardner].
85. Cf. Lincoln v. Lincoln, 24 N.Y.2d 270, 247 N.E.2d 659, 299 N.Y.S.2d 842 (1969),
in which the New York Court of Appeals approved a completely private interview, noting
that proceedings must be modified in a custody hearing so that the interview would still
serve its primary purpose: obtaining significant information the judge needs to make the
best possible decision. Although this reasoning makes perfect sense, the risk of error or
abuse of discretion in such an interview is simply too great. See Watermeier, 462 So. 2d
at 1274-75:
The attorneys and parties, as well as the appellate court, would be forced to
trust completely .. . the discretion of the trial judge . . .without ever knowing
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3. The Governmental Interest
Louisiana Civil Code article 146 requires that the award-of custody
to one or both parents be made "according to the best interest of the
children." Accordingly, the Louisiana Supreme Court in Turner v. Turner86
explained the role of the trial judge as follows:
[He] sits as a sort of fiduciary on behalf of the child, and must
pursue actively that course of conduct which will be of the
greatest benefit to the child .... He must protect the child from
the harsh realities of the parents' . . . conflict. The legislature
has mandated that the judge shall look only to the child's best
interest.17
Thus, the state's interest in the child's welfare has been declared
both by statute and by jurisprudence to be of foremost concern in a
custody dispute.
4. The Value of Procedural Safeguards
Procedural due process demands that the elements of the three-part
inquiry be weighted and balanced.8" While the state's paramount concern
is for the best interest of the child, the parents must also receive
protection of their liberty interest in the custody of their children. These
two interests must further be balanced against the significant risk of
error present in a completely confidential judicial interview.
Basic to an attempt to insulate the judicial interview from a due
process attack is a requirement that a verbatim record be made. 9 The
making of a record would serve to decrease the risk of error by the
judge who, knowing the transcript would be subject to review, would
what was told to him .... In addition, there would be no way for a party to
ever contest, disprove, or argue on appeal any statement ... that the child
may have made .
See Newman and Collester, supra note 11, at 11; Siegel and Hurley, supra note 30, at
55; Lombard, supra note 10, at 817.
86. 455 So. 2d 1374 (La. 1984).
87. Id. at 1379. The court added that "[tihe legislature has mandated that the judge
shall look only to the child's interests," and not to whatever interests the parents may
have. This quote must be interpreted in the context of the case, which was a drawn-out
custody battle with the children being used as pawns. Nonetheless, it is still a strong
statement for the best interest of the child taking precedence over the interests of the
parents.
88. See supra notes 73-75 and accompanying text.
89. Seigel and Hurley, supra note 30, at 57: "Recording ... appear[s] to effectively
preserve essential legal guarantees that a fair hearing will be conducted." But see Osborne
v. McCoy, 485 So. 2d 150 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1986), discussed supra note 19. It is not
clear that the objection in Osborne to the failure to record the interview was founded
explicitly on due process grounds.
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be restrained from asking improper questions. In addition, having a
transcript of the interview available is the only way to ensure fair
appellate review. Thus, unless the parties agree otherwise, the interview
must be recorded to satisfy the requirements of due process.
Given that a verbatim record is essential to a procedurally fair
interview, the analysis must also consider which parties, if any, should
be allowed to attend and/or participate. Most experts agree that allowing
the parents to be present as a procedural safeguard would be unsatis-
factory; although their liberty interest in the outcome of the case is
significant, their presence would be likely to impede the fact-finding
purpose of the interview. 90 There remain two alternatives as possible
safeguards: (1) a recorded interview at which the attorneys may be
present either as participants or observers; and (2) a recorded interview
at which the attorneys are excluded.
Arguably, a procedure which uses the presence of the attorneys as
a safeguard would have an impact similar to allowing the presence of
the parents. The attorneys' presence would probably make the proceeding
more unpleasant for the child and inhibit his responses in order to avoid
a hurt or angry reaction by his parents in case the attorneys divulge
his statements. In extreme circumstances, the child might even endure
psychological trauma in the form of anxiety and feelings of guilt. Thus,
allowing the attorneys to be present could actually contribute to the
risk of error, especially in cases in which the parents are particularly
hostile and the attorneys are particularly adversarial.
Several states do not require that counsel be present during the
interview. 9' An especially good statement of the reasoning used by these
states appears in Lesauskis v. Lesauskis.92 In this case, the Michigan
Court of Appeal allowed a judge to conduct a recorded in camera
hearing with the parents and attorneys barred from attending. The parties
were not allowed access to the record, which was transcribed, sealed,
and sent to the appellate court. Noting that the paramount concern in
a custody case is the best interest of the child, the court held that such
a procedure did not violate due process. 93
At the time of the case, Michigan law limited the scope of the
interview by allowing the judge to elicit the child's preference only, and
permitting inquiry as to the reasons. In light of this limitation, the court
reasoned that the presence of counsel would have slight utility, and was
outweighed by the child's probable reaction to their "foreboding pres-
90. See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text.
91. Jones, supra note 5, at 54. As of 1984, nine states by statute allowed trial judges
discretion to bar attorneys. At least three others by their jurisprudence used the same
approach.
92. 111 Mich. App. 811, 314 N.W.2d 767 (1981).
93. Id. at 816, 314 N.W.2d at 769.
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ence. ' '94 In Louisiana, the court is not limited in the scope of the
interview, and the judge may question the child not only as to his
preference, but also as to his reasons for it. 9 The reasoning of the
Michigan court is still persuasive, though, in its suggestion that due
process can be satisfied as long as the interview is recorded, even if
the parties and their attorneys are not given access to the record.
Furthermore, the Lesauskis approach would certainly seem to elim-
inate the unpleasant atmosphere created for the child by the presence
of the attorneys and/or their access to the record. Some would doubt,
however, that due process could be achieved without the presence of
the parties or their counsel. Nonetheless, as the Supreme Court declared
in Mathews, due process is a flexible concept. Not every situation will
justify excluding the attorneys. Only when the judge discerns that the
risk of harm presented by their presence to the accuracy of the interview
or to the child's psychological well-being outweighs the protection af-
forded the parents, may the judge exclude them. 96 (Such a situation
hereinafter will be referred to as a "worst case scenario.")
Before excluding the attorneys, the judge should be required to make
detailed findings in the record as to why he thinks it is necessary to
do so. For instance, where the dispute is particularly acrimonious and
the child appears to have been unduly subjected to his parents' diffi-
culties, the judge should describe the circumstances as cause to believe
the child may not respond reliably unless the attorneys are excluded.
Similarly, where the attorneys have been particularly hostile to each
other's clients and have shown no indication of behaving differently to
the child, the judge would be justified in excluding them. Procedurally,
it is crucial that the judge be required to balance the reasons for his
decision against the need to protect the parents' interests, and that these
conclusions are reflected in the record. The record will act as a significant
check on the judge, will encourage careful consideration of the issue,
and will enable the parties to appeal the decision.
In support of the above proposals, consider that the Watermeier
court did not believe due process required the attorneys be allowed to
participate in the interview; rather, they were allowed only to observe.97
Since they may not participate, their presence can serve only to deter
the judge from asking improper questions, to inform them of what was
said during the interview in case of an appeal, and to let them observe
the child's demeanor.
94. Id.
95. La. Civ. Code art. 146(C)(2) allows the court to consider the reasonable preference
of the child and any other relevant factors. The child's reasons for his preference are
certainly relevant factors.
96. Mathews, 424 U.S. 319, 96 S. Ct. 893.
97. Watermeier, 462 So. 2d at 1275.
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The first two purposes can be served just as well by making a
verbatim record of the interview and by allowing the attorneys later
access to it.9 The child's demeanor, on the other hand, will not be
reflected in the record, yet could lend considerable insight into his
responses. For example, as the attorneys are likely to be more familiar
with the case, they may spot problems with the child's testimony more
readily, such as coaching by a parent. As a partial remedy for this
problem, the judge might solicit sample questions and suggestions from
the attorneys beforehand. This procedure would allow the attorneys to
alert the judge to particular issues or problem areas. These sample
questions and suggestions would aid the judge in extracting more per-
tinent, and perhaps more accurate, information from the child.
Alternatively, if demeanor was critical to a particular case, the
interview could be videotaped. 99 Due process would not normally require
a videotaping, as it would not be necessary to achieve a fair result. In
addition, the child may be intimidated by the camera. The decision to
videotape should therefore be left to the judge's discretion. He should
make his decision according to the balancing approach outlined in Ma-
thews.
5. Summary
In summary, due process requirements can, in the worst case scen-
ario, be satisfied by making a verbatim record of the interview. The
judge should have the discretion to bar the attorneys from the interview,
but he must first justify this action by a finding in the record that the
harm to the accuracy of the interview and to the state's interest in
protecting the child outweighs the parents' interests in having the at-
torneys present. The parties could appeal this decision to exclude the
attorneys, since its basis would be a part of the record. If the judge
does exclude the attorneys, he should ask them beforehand for sample
questions and suggestions, thus giving them a chance to contribute to
the interview even without being present. If the child's demeanor is a
hotly contested issue, the judge should consider videotaping the interview.
If the judge does allow the attorneys to be present, he must still
make a verbatim record. He should also follow the procedure outlined
in Watermeier and allow them to act as observers only. He should keep
in mind that many who have considered the problem feel that having
the attorneys present does more harm than good.'00 Here also, since
98. Jones, supra note 5, at 80; Newman and Collester, supra note 11, at 11.
99. For an example of the use of videotaping involving victims of child abuse, see
La. R.S. 15:283 (Supp. 1987), and La. R.S. 15:440-440.6 (Supp. 1987).
100. Lombard, supra note 10, at 813; Jones, supra note 5, at 56, 80; Newman and
Collester, supra note 11, at 10.
1987]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
they may not participate, the judge should consider obtaining suggestions
and sample questions from the attorneys. The parties will be able to
appeal errors or abuse of discretion alleged to have occurred during the
interview by using the record.
Probably the single most important recommendation this comment
has to make is this: whatever procedure is followed by the judge, he
should always explain to the child exactly what is being done. He should
tell the child at the outset that the child's statements cannot be kept
secret from his parents.'0 '
IV. SUGGESTED METHODS FOR ELICITING ACCURATE INFORMATION IN A
JUDICIAL INTERVIEW
There remains the problem of how to question the child and ac-
curately interpret his responses. This section will discuss some of the
various theories and approaches used by mental health professionals for
questioning children in custody cases.
First of all, the questions must be kept simple and within range of
the child's mental capacity. 0 2 The judge should attempt to empathize
with the child to put him at ease; he should tell the child that the
divorce is not the child's fault and that his parents still care for him.'0 3
The judge should explain that the purpose of the interview is to help
him do the best thing for the child, and should ask the child to help
him.t°4 The child should be warned that his statements cannot be kept
secret and that his parents will probably find out what he says. The
judge should explain that the court reporter will be recording the child's
statements. 05
The initial questions in the interview should be specific and easy to
answer, such as:
101. Critics of these recommendations will cry out that there must be a check on
the judge and his potential for abuse of discretion or error. The proposed model procedure
does, however, provide protection against such abuses, by requiring the judge to make
detailed findings prior to excluding the attorneys, and also to make a record of the
interview. Cf. Osborne v. McCoy, 485 So. 2d 150 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1986).
102. Stafford, supra note 30, at 319.
103. Saposnek, supra note 9, at 87-88; interviews with Louisiana judges.
104. Interviews with Louisiana judges.
105. This is very important and should never be omitted. If a child talked freely under
the mistaken belief that his words would be kept secret and then his parents found out,
the effect on the child could be devastating. At least one prominent authority, Dr. R.
Gardner, does not warn children that the interview will not be confidential; he says he
has never found it to cause a problem. See Gardner, supra note 81, at 155-56. This
author finds that view hard to accept.
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Where do you go to school?
Do you have any brothers and sisters?
How old are you?"°6
These questions are the same ones normally used during the com-
petency determination. As long as they are asked at some point, they
will serve the function of putting the child at ease. If he can answer
the first few questions with confidence, he will be much more at ease
during the difficult ones that follow. The questions should progress from
the more specific to the more open-ended."°7
The judge should ask the attorneys to submit a list of questions
they would like the judge to ask the child. Their special knowledge of
the facts of the case may produce extremely valuable sample questions.
In this way, parents and attorneys will be given the opportunity to
contribute to the interview.
There are certain key issues that the judge should consider. The
best treatment of these issues is found in a book by Diane Skafte entitled
Child Custody Evaluations.08 It is filled with practical suggestions and
does not require a background in behavioral sciences to understand its
proposals. The issues Skafte identifies as important to consider are as
follows:1°9
1. How well is the child functioning physically, intellectually,
and emotionally?
[Examine the child's motor skills, his ability to think clearly,
and his emotional maturity.]
2. What kind of relationship does the child have with his
parents?
[Examine the child's attachment: Which one does he like to be
with? What do they like to do together? Which one does he
identify with? Also, how well does the child communicate with
each parent? Does he share his feelings? Is he warm and spon-
taneous? Which parent does he ask for advice on important
issues?
Finally, examine the child's responses to his parents' efforts at
discipline. Does he rebel with one parent? Is he intimidated by
the other?]
3. How does the child feel regarding the award of custody?
[Does he volunteer a preference? Or does he avoid talking? Does
he harbor unspoken feelings? Is his behavior consistent with his
106. Gardner, supra note 81, at 176.
107. Newman and Collester, supra note 11, at 11.
108. Skafte, Child Custody Evaluations (1985) [hereinafter Skafte].
109. Id. at 95-97. Bracketed material indicates elaborations by the author of this
comment.
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spoken preference?]
4. Are there any other specific issues raised by the facts of
the case? If so, they should be considered.
When considering these issues, the judge should keep in mind that
a child may not always say what he really means. As mentioned earlier,
children frequently use certain "strategies" to cope with the otherwise
uncontrollable aspects of their parents' divorce. These strategies are
specific and individualized, and the younger a child is, the harder it is
to ascertain what he may be doing." 0 David Saposnek, in Mediating
Child Custody Disputes,"' identifies the more common strategies and
suggests possible interpretations of the child's behavior; for example:
1. Reunion strategy: The child will praise both parents, or the
parent "at fault," hoping they will respond to the praise by
reuniting. The judge should be alert to descriptions of the parents
that sound too good to be true.
2. Pain reduction strategy: The parents may both claim that
the child refuses to leave one to visit the other. The child is
probably just trying to reduce the pain he feels each time he
leaves one parent by refusing to leave, which does not indicate
a preference for one parent over the other.
3. Tension detonation strategy: The child may seem very hostile
toward one or both parents. It is possible that he is trying to
get them to direct their anger toward him instead of each other,
and to detonate the tension between them by having them strike
out at him.
4. Loyalty proving strategy: The child may pick the parent
that seems the most likely to keep him around and sacrifice the
other parent to show his loyalty.
5. Fairness strategy: The child will repress his own needs in
order to make sure each parent gets equal treatment. He will
probably refuse to state a preference, and will exhaust himself
trying to divide his time and affection equally between his parents.
6. Permissive living strategy: The child will give up trying to
reunite his parents and will repress his pain. He may appear to
be coping well, while he is actually manipulating his parents to
his own best advantage. Older adolescents are more likely to
use this strategy consciously. Younger children are more likely
to use it innocently, as when they express a natural preference
for the parent who buys nicer presents or who has had custody
during vacations.1
2
110. Saposnek, supra note 9, at 119-33.
111. Id.
112. Id.
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The behavior described in each of the above examples is open to several
interpretations; the strategies suggested, however, are the ones most likely
to be overlooked. There are certainly more obvious interpretations, the
most obvious being that the child means exactly what he says. However,
a judge should at least consider the possibility that a strategy might be
in use, especially if the child seems to contradict himself or if his
statements do not seem in accord with the facts.
Another common problem involves the possibility that the child has
been coached by one or both parents. Sometimes, coaching is fairly
easy to detect, as when adult phrases come out of the child's mouth.
For instance, a judge should notice something is wrong when a young
child says, "My mother has been primarily responsible for my care since
birth.""' 3 However, detection of the more subtle betrayals of coaching
require careful attention. If the child sounds like he is speaking a
memorized piece, it may indicate coaching." 4 On the other hand, es-
pecially with older children, the child may be speaking his true feelings;
he may have just memorized what he wanted to say in preparation for
such a crucial proceeding." 5 Another indication is when the child con-
demns one parent to such a degree that the parent seems to be more
evil than is humanly possible." 6 The likely source of the vilification is
the coaching parent. Finally, the degree of conviction the child conveys
can serve as a clue. A child's true feelings are often expressed with
much more conviction than those that have been drilled into him."'
In the final analysis, the judge must rely on his own intuition. If
he thinks the child has been coached, he should question the child about
it. If he still believes that the child is not expressing his true feelings,
he should give little weight to the child's stated preference and pay more
attention to the child's behavior and his responses to indirect questions.
Having identified the issues to be considered and coping strategies
which may get in the way, there remains the question of how to get
the information from the child. Again, Skafte gives very useful examples
of techniques employed by behavioral scientists."' These techniques vary
according to the age of the child. Some of them are listed as follows.
Ages 0-3 years old: Behavioral scientists concede that a child
this age cannot be interviewed. About all that can be done is
to observe him with his parents. A judge would not have time
to do this, so children this young probably should not be in-
113. Newman and Collester, supra note 11, at 11; Gardner, supra note 81, at 176.
114. Gardner, supra note 81, at 176.
115. Id. at 177.
116. Id.
117, Id.
118. Skafte, supra note 108, at 98-114.
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terviewed. (It is interesting to note that the ages here correspond
to the age cut-off identified in the section on competency.)"19
Ages 3-5 years old: The child is still too young to be interviewed
in the question and answer mode. The best approach is to play
games with him and observe his responses. For example, let him
use pictures or dolls to help tell a story. Pretend he is at
mommy's house, then at daddy's house, or vice versa. Allow
him to choose which house to visit first, and let him suggest
what happens there.
Another effective game is the Three Wishes Game. Give him
three wishes and ask him what they would be. Usually the first
is that his parents would reunite. If his second wish is that he
could go live with a certain one, he has just stated a preference.
Another more elaborate game for children with a strong
imagination is the Desert Island Game. Tell the child a story
in which he is stranded on a desert island with every material
comfort he could ever want. A good fairy comes along and
offers to bring one companion to the island. Let the child choose
his companion. Urge him gently to choose one of his parents.
If he refuses, work out a happy ending and drop the story.
Ages 5-8 years old: The child is old enough to gain most of
the information just by talking with him. The Three Wishes
Game can be used to get him to think. Otherwise the questions
listed in Appendix A to this comment should yield accurate
results.
Ages 10 or older: Do not try to play games; tell the child that
you both know why you are here. Use the questions listed in
Appendix A, and any others you have found useful. Even if
the child states a clear preference, probe his underlying feelings
carefully to make sure there is not a coping strategy at work. 20
The judge should not directly ask the child to state a preference.
He should try to determine the child's preference indirectly from the
responses to other questions. At the end of the interview, he should
ask the child if there is anything else he would like to say. If the child
wants to state a preference, he will probably state it. If not, then he
should not be pressured. If the judge feels strongly that he should
specifically ask the child to state a preference, then he should make it
clear to the child that he does not have to state one. The child should
clearly understand that the final decision will be made by the judge, so
119. See supra notes 26-29 and accompanying text.
120. Skafte, supra note 108, at 98-114.
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the child will not feel guilty for causing one of his parents to be hurt.
EVALUATION BY A MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSIONAL-AN ALTERNATIVE
Civil Code article 146(H) authorizes the use of an evaluation by a
mental health professional (an evaluator).' 2' The court is free to select
the evaluator to be used, and may apportion the costs between both
parties. The parties and children "shall" submit to the evaluation upon
the court's order., 22 The evaluator must provide the court and both
parties with a written report, and must serve as the court's witness,
subject to cross-examination by either party.
Although article 146(H) only authorizes an evaluation to be ordered
"on the motion of either party," judges often order evaluations on their
own motion in reliance on article 146(C)(3), which authorizes the judge
to order an investigation to be conducted to assist him in awarding
custody. 121
The Louisiana Supreme Court noted in Turner v. Turner'2 4 that the
court has broad independent powers under this article, and may order
an investigation into the mental health of the child or any other factor
the judge deems important. Such an investigation for all practical pur-
poses would be the same as an "evaluation" under article 146(H), and
herein will be referred to accordingly.
By requiring a written report and in-court testimony by the evaluator,
the evaluation process avoids the due process problems that plague the
private judicial interview. 25 Similarly, the competency issue becomes
irrelevant, since the evaluator, and not the child, is the witness. This
procedure may also be more attractive because, although the evaluator
must state the substance of the child's statements in his report, he can
phrase them in a way to diminish their emotional impact on the par-
ents. 26 As a result, the parents are less likely to punish the child for
121. See La. Civ. Code art. 146(H), supra note 6. A mental health professional is
defined in that article as "a psychiatrist or a person who possesses a Master's degree in
counseling, social work, psychology, or marriage and family counseling."
122. La. Civ. Code art. 146(H).
123. La. Civ. Code art. 146(C)(3), supra note 6.
124. Turner v. Turner, 455 So. 2d 1374 (La. 1984).
125. See supra notes 69-99 and accompanying text for a discussion of the due process
problems. See also In re Johnson, 283 So. 2d 333 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1973). In that
case, the court held that when a custody decision is based almost entirely on the evaluator's
recommendations, rather than on the facts the evaluator uncovered, and where the mother
was cut short before she could testify as to relevant facts, the mother was deprived of
due process.
126. Skafte, supra note 108, at 114-16. For example, the evaluator might say "Susie's
statements suggested .... The parents will be inclined to be angry at the evaluator
instead of at Susie. They will be able to console themselves that "maybe Susie didn't
really say it that way."
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his statements. Also, the professional will be able to tell the child that,
although the gist of his statements will be reported to his parents, his
exact words will not be, and that every effort will be made to prevent
them from being hurt or angry. 27 Thus, the child will be less likely to
withhold information than if he knows a record is being made, as in
a judicial interview. Nevertheless, the evaluator should always tell the
child that his statements will not remain totally confidential. 2 '
Of course, the evaluation alternative is not without its shortcomings.
Of foremost concern to the parties may be that the evaluator does not
make a verbatim record of the interview. Consequently, the parties
cannot prove what actually was said during the evaluation, and must
rely upon the evaluator's report in any subsequent appeal of the custody
decision. In this situation, the evaluator's report alone would provide
the reviewing court with information as to the child's preference. In
addition, the evaluation alternative is costly, and there is no guarantee
as to the competency of the evaluator chosen.
Ideally, however, the evaluator will possess a certain level of ex-
perience and expertise which will contribute to the accuracy of the
information gathered. Many judges, on the other hand, may not be
equipped to recognize the various "coping" strategies young children
may employ in a custody proceeding. 29 In the words of one author,
"Practically all judges lack special training in the crucial areas of child
development.'130
In addition to misinterpreting the child's statements, judges may be
unaware of certain techniques an evaluator might use to expose the
child's preference. Generally, judges have less time to spend with the
child than an evaluator. Consequently, the judge is likely to have less
time to get to know the child.
In conclusion, judges should consider having the child interviewed
and evaluated by a mental health professional, preferably a psycholo-
gist. 3 ' Ideally, a social worker could also go to the proposed custodial
homes and observe the child and parents interacting in an informal
atmosphere, although in some cases this option would be precluded by
the time and expense involved. Nevertheless, a social worker is more
127. Id. at 114-16.
128. Id,
129. Saposnek, supra note 9, at 122-23. See also supra notes 110-12 and accompanying
text.
130. Goldzband, supra note 81, at 30, 33.
131. A psychiatrist deals more with "organic" disorders, such as brain-damaged or
hyperactive children, and would be unnecessary in most instances. A psychologist is trained
in the behavioral sciences, and is better equipped to evaluate the child than a social
worker, who has less training. McCahey, supra note 30, Vol. 3, § 21.01(1) at 21-4; §
22.01 at 22-5; and § 23.01 at 23.4.
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suited to make this home visit than a psychologist, and would probably
charge a smaller fee. After the visit, the psychologist and social worker
would meet to compare and discuss their findings, and each would
submit a written report and testify at the hearing, as provided in article
146(H). Such an arrangement would likely provide reliable information,
leading to the best possible custody determination by the judge.
If, after receiving the evaluator's report, the judge would like to
talk to the child, he could schedule a judicial interview subject to the
procedural requirements outlined above. The interview would allow the
judge to get a feel for the case, and would provide the child with a
chance to express any changes of opinion he might have had in the
meantime. The judge would verify the information contained in the
reports and satisfy himself that the recommendations were sound. The
risk of error by the judge would be greatly reduced, since he would
have already read the reports and possibly would be alerted to any
strategies the child was using, as well as any other pertinent information
the evaluator had disclosed.
RECOMMENDATION
The child should be given an opportunity to provide information
important to the custody determination. If his parents do not ask for
his involvement, the judge should interview the child on his own ini-
tiative. However, participation should not be forced on an unwilling
child.
The model proposed herein, like the procedure in Watermeier, is
not intended to be mandatory if the parties consent to another method;
a standard mandatory procedure would destroy judicial flexibility, which
is greatly needed in such a delicate area of the law. Rather, the proposed
model is one which is intended to satisfy the minimum procedural
requirements of due process and to protect the child from further trauma
while he helps the court determine his best interest.
At the very least, due process requires that the interview be recorded.
The judge has discretion to exclude the attorneys from the interview if
the harm from their presence would outweigh any procedural benefit
to the parents. To do so he must make detailed findings in the record.
If the judge does not exclude the attorneys from the interview, he should
allow them to be present as observers only.
Before attempting to interview a child, a judge should familiarize
himself with the approaches used by behavioral scientists to elicit accurate
information from children. Suggested questions are provided in Appendix
A, to be used along with other questions the judge finds useful. The
judge should ask the attorneys to suggest questions, which could be
more valuable than any standard list, because of their special knowledge
of the case.
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Another helpful approach is to have the child and his parents
evaluated by a psychologist and observed in their homes by a counselor
or social worker. This evaluation may serve either in conjunction with,
or in place of, the judicial interview. It may, however, prove too costly.
Nothing can take the place of common sense and sensitivity to the
child's plight. Judges are intelligent and dedicated people, and are quite
capable of making appropriate custody awards based on the information
they elicit during judicial interviews. Hopefully, this comment will serve
to provide some background knowledge, and ultimately to improve the
accuracy of the information gained in the interviews. For every child
that is destined to go through a custody hearing in the future, the
judiciary should strive to obtain an accurate determination of his best
interests in the least traumatic manner possible.
Lisa Carol Rogers
APPENDIX A
Proposed Questions to Minor Children in Divorce Cases132
OPENING STATEMENTS
I'm Judge . I'm pleased to meet you today. Sit down
and make yourself comfortable. You know that your parents are getting
divorced and will not be living together anymore. I have to decide where
you will live.
Your thoughts and feelings will really help me to make a decision
as to which parent you will live with. I would like you to know it will
not be your decision.
In order that you may help me I must ask you some questions. If
at any time you want to ask me any questions, please do so!
QUESTIONS
1. Please tell me your full name.
2. How old are you? When were you born?
132. These questions were printed as part of an appendix to Professor Lombard's
article, Judicial Interviewing of Children in Child Custody Cases: An Empirical and
Analytical Study, 17 U.C.D.L. Rev. 807, 848-50 (1984). They are reprinted with the
permission of Professor Lombard and the U.C. Davis Law Review, and were originally
compiled and approved by the Family Law Section of the State Bar of Michigan. The
questions are intended to be used mainly with children under twelve years of age.
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3. What is your mother's name?
4. What is your father's name?
5. What does your mother do during the daytime?
6. What does your father do during the daytime?
7. When do you go to school?
a) What are your school hours?
b) What are your grades?
c) What are your favorite subjects?
d) What do you do after school and during your free time?
e) What are your hobbies?
f) How do you think you will do in school this year?
g) Could you do better at school?
h) Who helps you with your homework?
8. Where do you eat your breakfast? Your lunch? Your dinner?
9. Who prepares your meals?
10. What do you do on weekends?
11. Who are your closest friends? What do you do with your
friends?
12. What do you do with your mother?
13. What do you do with your father?
14. Have you talked to your mother about talking to me or coming
to court? What did she say?
15. Have you talked to your father about talking to me or coming
to court? What did he say?
16. When you have done something wrong, who punishes you or
talks to you about it?
a) How does your mother punish you?
b) How does your father punish you?
17. What is the one thing your mother does that makes you the
maddest?
18. What is the one thing your father does that makes you the
maddest?
a) What problems do you talk to your mother about?
b) What problems do you talk to your father about?
c) If you accidently broke a window, what would your mother
do? What would your father do?
d) If you fell and injured your knee, who would you go to?
e) If you had a fight with your best friend, who would you
talk to? Why did you pick that person?
f) If you were picked on at school, who would you talk to?
Why?
19. When you're sick, who takes care of you?
20. When you have to go to the doctor or dentist, who takes you?
21. How long have you lived where you are living?
22. Is your mother in good health?
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23. Is your father in good health?
24. If you were home in the afternoon alone with your mother,
what do you think you would do?
25. If you were home in the afternoon alone with your father,
what do you think you would do?
26. When you go on vacation, where do you go? With whom do
you go? What do you do on your vacation?
27. Do you have any heroes? What kind of people are your heroes?
What do you want to be when you grow up?
28. What are your interests in life, such as music, sports, church
and any other activities?
a) Has your mother helped you develop your interests?
b) Has your father helped you develop your interests?
29. Has either your mother or your father said anything bad about
the other?
30. Do you know what divorce is?
31. How did you learn about your parents' divorce?
a) Who told you?
b) When were you told?
c) Do you remember what was said?
d) How did you feel about the divorce?
32. If I decide that you must live with your mother, how would
you feel about my decision?
33. If I decide that you must live with your father, how would
you feel about my decision?
34. Do you have any questions? Is there anything you would like
to ask of me?
Thank you very much. It has been very nice talking to you.
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